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Abstract— Non Functional Requirements (NFRs) are relative, 
so are the conflicts among them. In our previously developed 
catalogue of NFRs conflicts it can be observed that a number 
of specific pairs of NFRs are claimed to be in conflicts in some 
cases but they are also claimed not to be in conflict in the other 
cases. These relative conflicts occur because the positive or 
negative relationships among NFRs are not always clear and 
obvious. These relationships might change depending on the 
meaning of NFRs within the system being developed. This 
paper focuses on the application of ontology in managing the 
relative conflicts among NFRs, particularly the relative 
conflicts between security and usability requirements. The aim 
is to develop a framework to identify, characterize, and define 
corresponding resolution strategies for the security-usability 
conflicts. This paper thus describes the sureCM framework to 
manage these conflicts; summarizes the security-usability 
conflicts ontology; and demonstrates how the ontology will be 
used as a basis to assist analysts in managing conflicts between 
security and usability requirements.   
Keywords–non-functional requirements, conflicts, relative, 
framework, management, ontology, security, usability 
 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
NFRs are recognized as a critical factor to the success of 
software projects. NFRs address the essential issue of the 
quality of the systems [1-3]; and are also considered as the 
qualifications of the operations [4, 5]. In the determination of 
a system's perceived success or failure, experience shows 
that NFRs are often more critical than individual Functional 
Requirements (FRs). Neglecting NFRs has led to a series of 
software failures, such as a number of systemic failures 
discussed in the literature [6-9]. 
However, although NFRs are widely recognized to be 
very critical, several studies reveal that NFRs are often 
neglected, poorly understood and not considered adequately 
in developing a software application. In the development of 
software systems, users naturally focus on specifying their 
FRs [1, 10]. Similarly, software developers also do not pay 
sufficient attention to NFRs [2, 11-13]. NFRs are not elicited 
at the same time and the same level of details as the FRs and 
they are often poorly articulated in the requirements 
document [12, 13]. Capturing, specifying, and managing 
NFRs are still difficult to perform because most software 
developers do not have adequate knowledge about NFRs and 
little help is available in the literature [14]. 
One of the characteristics of NFRs is “interacting”, which 
means NFRs tend to interfere, conflict, and contradict with 
one other. Unlike FRs, this inevitable conflict arises as a 
result of inherent contradiction among various types of NFRs 
[1, 2]. Certain combinations of NFRs in the software systems 
may affect the inescapable trade offs [2, 7, 10]. Achieving a 
particular type of NFRs can hurt the achievement of the other 
type(s) of NFRs.  
Prior studies reveal that dealing with NFRs conflicts is 
essential due to several reasons [15]. First of all, conflicts 
among software requirements are inevitable [1, 16, 17]. 
Conflicting requirements are one of the three main problems 
in the software development in term of the additional effort 
or mistakes attributed to them [17]. A study of two-year 
multiple-project analysis conducted by Egyed & Boehm [18, 
19] reports that between 40% and 60% of requirements 
involved are in conflict, and among them, NFRs involved the 
greatest conflict, which was nearly half of requirements 
conflict [20]. Lessons learnt from practices also confirm that 
one of the essential issues during NFRs specification is 
management of conflict among interacting NFRs [2]. 
Experience shows that most systems suffer with severe 
tradeoffs among the major groups of NFRs. In fact, conflict 
resolutions for handling NFRs conflicts often results in 
changing overall design guidelines, not by simply changing 
one module. Therefore, since conflicts among NFRs have 
also been widely acknowledged as one of NFRs 
characteristics, managing this conflict as well as making this 
conflict explicit is important [21]. NFRs conflicts 
management is essential for finding the right balance of 
attributes satisfaction in achieving successful software 
product [7, 10]. 
 
II. PROBLEM DEFINITION 
A number of techniques to manage the conflicts among 
NFRs have been discussed in the literature [15]. Majority of 
them provide documentation, catalogue, or list of potential 
conflicts among NFRs. These catalogues represent the 
interrelationships among various types of NFRs. Some 
examples are: the QARCC win-win approach [7, 22, 23], 
trace analyzer of the requirements traceability technique 
[24], and a technique that adopts a hierarchical constraint 
logic programming approach [25]. Apart from strength and 
weaknesses of each technique, however, NFRs are also 
relative [1]. NFRs can be viewed, interpreted, and evaluated 
differently by different people and different context within 
which the system is being developed. The interpretation and 
importance of NFRs may vary depending on the particular 
system and/or the extent of stakeholder involvement. 
Consequently, the positive or negative relationships among 
NFRs are not always obvious. These relationships might 
change depending on the meaning of NFRs in the context of 
the system being developed. Due to this relative 
characteristic, cataloguing the NFRs relationships in order to 
represent the conflicts among NFRs would inevitably 
produce disagreement. Identifying the NFRs conflict without 
understanding the meaning of NFRs in the system being 
developed may produce the erroneous conflict identification 
and analysis. Therefore, a technique to identify the conflict 
among NFRs by considering the relative characteristic of 
NFRs is essential. This technique will allow developers to 
identify and reason case by case in each system which NFRs 
of the system are in conflict and which NFRs are not. 
To understand how NFRs conflict with each other, a 
catalogue of conflicts among NFRs with respect to NFRs 
relative characteristic has been developed from the literature 
[26]. This catalogue is a two-dimensional matrix that 
represents the typical interrelationships among NFRs, in 
term of the conflict emerges among them. In this catalogue, 
the relativity of NFRs conflicts is presented in three 
categories: absolute conflict (labeled as “X”); relative 
conflict (labeled as “*”); and never conflict (labeled as “O”). 
As illustrated in Figure 1, 19 pairs of NFRs in the catalogue 
are indicated have the relative conflicts, which means they 
are not always in conflict as they are claimed to be in conflict 
in the certain cases but they are also claimed as not being in 
conflict in the other cases. By combining this result with two 
other parameters: frequently listed NFRs; and concerned 
NFRs in various types of systems and applications domains 
[9], then this research focuses on investigating the relative 





Figure 1 - Catalogue of Conflicts among NFRs [26] 
 
Security requirements are widely recognized to be in 
conflict with usability requirements [27-29]. Security usually 
aims to make operations harder to do while usability aims to 
make operations easier [27]. Studies to date also indicate that 
current trend and challenge in the software engineering 
research and practices is producing such secure usable 
software products [28-30]. Systems that are secure but not 
usable will not be used, while systems that are usable but not 
secure will get hacked and compromised [28]. In fact, 
literature review reveals that the conflicts between security 
and usability are still not well understood. Braz, Seffah & 
Raihi in [31] even claim that “there is a very limited amount 
of work has been conducted on the security – usability 
conflicts, particularly on the intimate relationship that exists 
between security and usability”. 
Given the above context we are motivated to perform an 
investigation into the conflicts among NFRs, particularly the 
security-usability relative conflicts in order to increase our 
understanding about how these two NFRs conflict with and 
affect one another and how this conflict might be managed. 
Our research questions have been formulated as follow: 
“With respect to the NFRs relative characteristic: 
(1) Can we create a conceptual model of the conflicts 
between security and usability requirements? 
(2) Can software developer use this model to manage 
(identify, characterize, and find the potential 
strategy to resolve) the conflict?” 
 
III. FRAMEWORK DEVELOPMENT 
By adopting the IEEE Standard and ISO/IEC 9126, this 
research considers security requirements as the requirements 
that concern the protection of system, program and data from 
unauthorized access or malicious harm; and usability 
requirements as the requirements that specify the capability 
of the software product to be understood, learned, used, and 
attract the user [32, 33]. With respect to the NFRs relative 
characteristic, the term “NFRs conflict” is defined as a case 
where the satisfaction of a pair of NFRs is not possible 
within a specific context of the system being developed. 
An iterative ontological engineering approach will be 
used as a basis of the framework. The reasons are ontology 
offers many benefits such as presenting an explicit semantic 
and taxonomy [34]; providing a clear link between concepts 
and their relationships [34]; assisting people in developing 
the representations or images of reality [35]; and facilitating 
knowledge sharing in the community [36, 37]. Thus, we 
believe that ontology will enable us to conceptualize the 
knowledge of security and usability conflicts. Ontology will 
assist us in investigating the conflicts phenomena, collecting 
the relevant information, conceptualizing the knowledge, and 
representing the conceptualization. Therefore, in this 
research, an ontological model of the security and usability 
conflicts with respect to NFRs relative characteristic will be 
developed. This ontology then will be used as the basis of the 
framework to manage the conflicts between security and 
usability requirements.  
In building the framework and its ontology, we follow 
the Helix-Spindle Model for ontological engineering [38]. 
The reasons are:  
(1) It has been recognized (e.g. [39]) that ontology is 
never complete. Thus, successful development of 
ontology is an iterative and incremental process [40]. 
The Helix-Spindle model reflects this iterative 
incremental development process through its three 
major phases: conception phase, elaboration phase, 
and definition phase. 
(2) Helix-Spindle model combines both the theoretic and 
the pragmatic approaches to ontology development. 




Figure 2 - sureCM Framework Development Process 
 
As shown in Figure 2, the framework and its ontology 
will be developed in three major phases: conception phase, 
elaboration phase, and definition phase, following the Helix-
Spindle model of ontological engineering. In the conception 
phase, the framework and its ontology will be 
conceptualized. Concepts, relationships, and behaviors of the 
ontology will be identified. An abstract level of the ontology 
will become the output of this phase. Then, each concept in 
the ontology will be elaborated in the elaboration phase. The 
hierarchy of security requirements meaning, usability 
requirements meaning, the conflicts impact, and the potential 
resolution strategies are created within this phase. Literature 
will be used as the main source for developing this ontology. 
Furthermore, in order to triangulate and enrich the ontology, 
a survey of practice will also be conducted. In definition 
phase, the ontology will be revised and formalized by using 
an ontological representation. Finally, the proposed 
ontological framework will be realized through the 
development of a proof of concept software tool that will be 
evaluated using experimentation. 
 
IV. THE FRAMEWORK 
A preliminary model of the security-usability 
requirements conflicts management (sureCM) framework is 
shown in Figure 3. The framework is specifically designed to 
identify and to characterize the conflicts between security 
and usability requirements and to discover the corresponding 
strategy for conflicts resolution. This framework consists of 
four types of input (i.e. security requirements, system 
context, application domain, usability requirements); four-
layer process (i.e. P1, P2, P3, P4); and three types of output 
(i.e. list of conflict, nature of conflict, conflict resolution 
strategy). The security-usability conflicts ontology will be 




Figure 3 - Security-Usability Requirements Conflicts 
Management Framework 
 
Figure 4 shows a preliminary conceptual model of the 
security-usability conflicts ontology. With respect to NFRs 
relative characteristic, two key-parameters are used to 
identify the existence of conflict: (1) the meaning of NFRs; 
and (2) the system context. The meaning of NFRs refers to 
the interpretation of NFRs in the system being developed 
while the system context refers to the context within which 
the system is being developed, that is characterized as the 
system type. The nature of conflicts is characterized as the 
impact of the conflicts against various components in the 
software development, e.g. personnel and schedule. Based on 
the nature of this conflict, then the corresponding strategies 
for conflict resolution will be identified with respect to the 
system’s application domain. 
 
 
Figure 4 - Security-Usability Conflicts Ontology 
 
As shown in Figure 4, this ontology has five concepts: 
security meaning; usability meaning; security-usability 
conflict; impact of conflict; and resolution strategy. The 
ontology behavior is represented by 3 types of relationships: 
is conflict; has; and associate. “Is conflict” represents which 
pair of security meanings are in conflict with usability 
meanings considering the system context. For each defined 
conflict, the corresponding potential consequences are then 
identified and linked by “has” relationship. Finally, with 
respect to the application domain, the conflict and its 
consequences are associated to the particular conflict 
resolution strategies through “associate” relationship.  
The ontology illustrated in Figure 4 then will be 
elaborated by characterizing the meaning of security and 
usability requirements in term of the existence of conflicts 
among them; the impact of the conflicts; and the potential 
strategy to resolve the conflicts. From this elaboration, a 
security-usability conflicts knowledge-based will be 
developed. This knowledge-based is a combination of 
concepts and values deriving from the security-usability 
conflicts ontology. Some key-components of this 
knowledge-based are listed in Table 1.  
 




The sureCM framework represents both a process for 
identifying, characterizing, and discovering resolution 
strategy of the conflicts between security and usability; and 
the ontology of the security-usability conflicts. The process 





Figure 5 - Framework Process Model 
 
As shown in Figure 5, the conflicts management process 
begin with the identification of the security and usability 
requirements meanings, the system context and the 
application domain. The ontology of security meaning, 
usability meaning, system context, and application domain 
will be used as the basis of identification. The second 
process is identifying the existence of conflicts. This process 
utilizes some outputs in the previous process: the security 
requirements meaning; the usability requirements meaning; 
and the context of the system, as the parameter identification. 
Next process is when conflicts are characterized by their 
impacts, leading to the identification of the corresponding 
resolution strategies within the system application domain. 
 
V. CONCLUSION 
This paper describes a proposed framework to manage 
the relative conflicts among NFRs, particularly the relative 
conflicts between security and usability requirements. The 
framework uses an ontological approach as the basis to 
manage the conflicts. An ontological model of the security-
usability requirements conflicts has been developed and 
presented. This ontology shows when security and usability 
are in conflict, what the impacts of the conflicts are, and 
what the relevant strategies to resolve this conflict are. 
Therefore, this proposed framework can be used to identify 
not only the existence of conflict, but also the type and 
significance of conflict, as well as the appropriate potential 
strategy to resolve the conflict. 
Although the conceptual model of the framework has 
been established; a number of conference papers on 
investigating the notion of NFRs, the conflicts among NFRs, 
and the catalogue of conflicts among NFRs with respect to 
NFRs relative characteristic have also been published [9, 15, 
26], however, several important tasks remain to complete the 
framework: 
1) Elaborate the security-usability conflicts ontology 
In the next step, we are going to continue developing the 
framework by elaborating the conflicts ontology through 
collecting information from literature. We will characterize 
the meaning of security and usability requirements in term of 
the conflict relationships among them with respect to the 
context of the system being developed; the impact of the 
conflicts; and the potential strategy to resolve the conflicts. A 
knowledge-based of security-usability conflicts will be the 
outcome of this step.  
2) Enrich and refine the ontology  
To enrich the ontology and to discover the insight from 
practitioners, we also plan to do the survey of practice. This 
survey of practice will be conducted to perform a 
triangulation of the existing potential conflict models and the 
framework to manage the conflicts among NFRs, 
particularly security-usability conflicts with respect to NFRs 
relative characteristic.    
3) Develop tool support 
To facilitate the framework utilization, we also plan to 
develop a tool that can assist software developers, 
particularly requirements engineers to perform managing 
conflicts between security and usability requirements. 
4) Framework empirical evaluation 
The framework will be evaluated through controlled 
experiments. The reason is because “controlled experiments 
make possible the careful observation and precise 
manipulation of independent variables (e.g. proposed 
framework), allowing for greater certainty, and encourage 
the researcher to try out novel frameworks in a safe and 
exploratory environment before implementing them in the 
real world settings” [41]. Effectiveness and efficiency will be 
used as the evaluation criteria. Effectiveness represents that 
this framework can be used to manage the NFRs conflicts, 
i.e. security-usability conflicts, by considering NFRs relative 
characteristic while efficiency represents how fast people can 
identify the conflicts using the framework. 
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